Much aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies. We test that prediction on insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly-available measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, the data emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces, and no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians (p<.05%). We speculate on possible explanations, introducing the notion of insurgent precision to decide between predation on the one hand, and security measures and information costs on the other.
Introduction
The vast majority of aid money spent to reduce political violence is motivated by an opportunity-cost theory of distracting recruits. Two causal logics underlie this theory 2 .
The most commonly cited is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in insurgent violence 3 . A slightly less prominent argument is that unemployment creates grievances, generating support for insurgent violence 4 . This support could lead to more violence directly-through more recruits or enhanced fundraising-or indirectly-by reducing the willingness of a population to share information with counter insurgents. Whichever causal pathway is posited, the testable implication is the same: a positive correlation between unemployment and insurgent violence. We test that prediction on data from Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, using unemployment surveys and three newly-available datasets that include two measures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces; and (2) violence that kills civilians.
The opportunity-cost approach is generally based upon a number of often implicit assumptions about the production of insurgent violence. Some of these include:
-Participation in insurgency is a full-time occupation, in the sense that individuals cannot be legitimately employed and active insurgents at the same time.
-Insurgency is a low-skill occupation so that creating jobs for the marginal unemployed reduces the pool of potential recruits.
-The supply of labor is a binding constraint on insurgent organizations.
Each of these assumptions is questionable in some contexts, suggesting first that empirical testing is warranted, and second, that the relationship between unemployment and insurgency may be more complex than is commonly assumed.
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Other causal channels predict a negative correlation between unemployment and violence.
Suppose, for example, that the main constraint on the production of violence is the extent to which non-combatants share information about insurgents with the government (Kalyvas, 2006; Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2008) . If counterinsurgents spend money to buy intelligence-as they routinely do-then as the local employment picture worsens and household incomes drop, the marginal dollar spent to buy information will go further and violence will fall. Alternatively, suppose that security efforts-establishing checkpoints and the like-reduce violence but also increase unemployment by impeding the movement of goods and services. That would imply a negative correlation between unemployment and violence. Or, fighting a perceived occupying force might be something people do out of belief in the cause, but can do only once their basic needs are satisfied. If insurgency is a normal -good‖ in this narrow sense, then an improved economic situation could lead to greater levels of participation and hence greater violence so that reduced unemployment causes more violence. We survey other alternative theories below.
To investigate these relationships we use panel data on local unemployment and insurgent violence in three countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. These countries vary greatly both in geography and in the nature and intensity of the insurgencies they face. Yet they yield broadly similar results.
The data rule out a positive correlation between unemployment and violence for all three countries: if there is an opportunity cost effect, it is not dominant in any of them. Using microdata from three countries provides plenty of inferential leverage. Assuming that the internal relationships between violence and unemployment within these countries are independent-a reasonable assumption given their geographic spread and the different time periods observed in each-then combining our results across countries allows us to reject the null hypothesis of a positive correlation at the 99.95% confidence level.
Why is the correlation of unemployment and violence generally negative? Existing data do not allow us to fully adjudicate between possible reasons, but we offer evidence that it is due to the relationship between local economic conditions and counterinsurgents' efforts to combat violence. Our findings are consistent with two hypotheses concerning counterinsurgency: (1) as local economic conditions deteriorate, government forces and their allies are able to buy more intelligence on insurgents (i.e., the price of information falls); and (2) efforts to enhance security-establishing checkpoints and the like-damage the economy.
The remainder of this paper describes our effort to study the relationship between unemployment and insurgent violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. First, we briefly review the existing literature. We then lay out a theoretical framework -including some alternatives, describe our data, report estimation results, and conclude.
Literature Survey
Three major theoretical arguments link unemployment and violence at the local level.
The first is the opportunity-cost approach which first surfaces in Becker's theory of crime (Becker, 1968) . Grossman (1991) applies it to rebels' time-allocation, predicting that as opportunities for potential rebels to work in legitimate occupations improve, the amount of time they will provide to insurgency declines.
The opportunity-cost approach is incorporated in Fearon's (2008) model that predicts insurgent violence will increase in income inequality as relatively poor rebels see more to gain from expropriating resources of the relatively rich. That links opportunity costs to a second theoretical mechanism-appropriation, or rent capture-the idea that the greater the economic gains associated with controlling an area, the greater the effort rebels will invest in violent capture. For example, Dube and Vargas (2008) report evidence that violence increases in oil-rich areas of rural Colombia when the price of oil increases. Similarly, Hidalgo et al (forthcoming) provide empirical evidence that economic shocks drive the rural poor in Brazil to invade large landholdings and that this effect is especially pronounced in areas of high land inequality and in areas with fixed-rent tenurial arrangements, which do not provide peasants insurance against income shocks. Blattman and Miguel (2009) provide a general survey.
A third major theoretical argument is the hearts-and-minds approach, which states that the key predictor of violence is the attitude of the population towards the government. That attitude in turn predicts whether insurgents can survive to conduct attacks against a militarily superior foe. This strain of thinking has been most prominent among practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Mao Tse-Tung famously argued the people are -the sea in which rebels must swim‖ (Mao, 1937 Triquier, 1961; Taber, 1965; Galula, 1964; Clutterbuck, 1966; Thompson, 1966; Kitson 1971 and Popkin 1979. 6 Articles by practitioners in this vein include Sepp, 2005; Petraeus, 2006; Cassidy, 2006; and McMaster 2008. Evidence generally supports opportunity-cost theory at the sub-national level with respect to crime. Studies show that in the United States crime rates increase as wages in the legal economy fall and as unemployment rises (Grogger, 1998; Gould et al 2002; Raphael and WinterEbmer, 2001) . A similar pattern has been observed with respect to insurgency in rural Columbia where increases in prices of agricultural commodities predict reduced insurgent violence (Dube and Vargas, 2008) and with respect to uprisings in Brazil where economic shocks drive land invasions by the rural poor (Hidalgo et al, forthcoming). These findings are consistent with cross-country evidence that low GDP/capita predicts civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) ; that correlation holds even when using rainfall to identify exogenous variation in GDP/capita (Miguel et al, 2004) .
Little formal quantitative research has been reported which tests opportunity cost theory in the context of political violence, or that tests hearts-and-minds theory, though the literature cited above is rife with supportive anecdotal evidence. This is unfortunate, as determining which mechanism is dominant-hearts and minds or opportunity costs-is critical to properly designing economic aid programs in efforts to rebuild social and political order.
Theoretical Framework
The opportunity cost approach is a theory of rebel recruitment and retention along the lines of Becker's (1968) theory of crime. Imagine a potential insurgent choosing between work at wage w, and insurgency. Many factors might influence the decision of those individuals, including commitment to a cause, risk aversion, attitudes towards violence, etc., all of which would influence the threshold market wage, w*, above which they would prefer work to insurgency. Let F(w*) be the cumulative distribution of threshold wages across both potential and current insurgents, and let N be the number of such individuals. For simplicity assume a single wage rate, w, in the economy. Then N(1-F(w)) is the number of insurgents, a decreasing function of wages in the normal economy. The sign of the derivative with respect to wages is negative, while the size is is given by the density and N, -Nf(w), which could be quite small if the number of insurgents and potential recruits is limited. Assuming that variation in unemployment is due to variation in labor demand, a negative correlation between wage rates and unemployment rates would yield a positive correlation between unemployment and the number of insurgents.
In this fairly general version of the opportunity cost theory, insurgents are drawn not only from among the unemployed, but also from among individuals in low wage employment or who are out of the labor force. One could easily generalize to a model in which insurgency is a not a full time job by adding an intensive (hours) margin, in which insurgent hours would also increase with market wages, and decrease with unemployment. Even among individuals who are currently out of the labor force the expectation of a high wage in some future employment, which would be precluded by being caught engaging in insurgency would yield the same insurgency-reducing effect of high wages. Overall, these complementary mechanisms all yield the same overall prediction of a positive correlation of unemployment and the number of insurgents.
We do not directly observe the size of the insurgent force, only the amount of violence. Does a larger insurgent force imply more violence? For very small insurgent forces that must be true, but the relationship could turn out to be non-monotonic. If an insurgency became strong enough in numbers, it may reach a point at which more insurgents may induce the government (and/or its allies ) to stop contesting the space, yielding less violence and much less measured violence (as measurement generally requires some degree of presence -with the notable exception of raids and air strikes).
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For a full analysis of the extent to which space is contested in a -Hearts and Minds‖ counterinsurgency, see Berman, Felter and Shapiro (2008) . They show that under fairly general conditions optimal effort by counterinsurgents increases monotonically with insurgent strength until the extreme case of uncontested regions is reached. Of the three conflicts we examine, the Afghan case is the one in which uncontested space is a real concern, which we treat in our empirical analysis below by separately examining Pashtun majority regions.
To summarize in terms of an estimating equation, across regions r=1..R, an opportunity cost theory predicts that the correlation between violence, v, and unemployment rates, u, will be negative, except if the region is uncontested, in which case the correlation should be zero (since the amount of violence is unrelated to the size of the insurgent force).
(1) v r =  +  u r +  r .
The first thing to note about this equation is that if violence increases unemployment by reducing access to markets or depressing investment, then an estimate of  will be biased upward, exaggerating the true opportunity cost effect. Alternatively, that coefficient could be biased in a negative direction-and in fact the estimated correlation between unemployment and violence could be negative-if rent capture, security measures, or information cost mechanisms are in play. While we do not observe those directly, it is useful to examine the implications for a regression involving observables. We examine those ideas in turn.
Rent capture, or predation, is the idea that violence is directed at the expropriation of economic rents, in the absence of some nonviolent means of dispute adjudication (Fearon, 2008; Dube and Vargas, 2008; Blattman and Miguel, 2009; Hidalgo et al, forthcoming) .). Economic rents would then be an omitted variable with a positive coefficient in (1), plausibly having a negative correlation with unemployment-as economic activity is unemployment reducing. That would imply a negative bias on our estimated coefficient on unemployment, which, if rent capture dominated the opportunity costs mechanism, could make it negative. If insurgency were a normal good, the bias and testable implications would be the same as those of predation.
Security measures provide a second avenue relating unemployment and violence.
Successful security measures reduce violence by definition. At the same time, roadblocks, curfews, barriers, spot inspections and other controls on the movement of people and goods might reduce economic activity, even accounting for the countervailing increase in economic activity due to improved security of people and property. That was the case in the West Bank and Gaza in the 1990s, for example, where the benefits of security measures imposed through movement and access restrictions accrued mostly to Israelis, while the economic costs were borne by Palestinians, generating very high unemployment rates (Fischer et al (2001) ; Kanaan (1998) These clear admonitions against civilian casualties imply that our insurgent precision measure is a reasonable proxy for the ease with which insurgents can attack.
Both the security effect and information cost mechanisms predict a negative relationship between unemployment and insurgent precision while the predation mechanism has no firm prediction. Both security and information effects should be strongest in more densely populated areas where the risk of killing civilians in any attack is greater, and hence the negative correlation between unemployment and insurgent precision should be strongest in densely populated areas.
In terms of an estimating equation, we have (2) p r = µ + π u r + d r +  u r d r + ν r , where p is insurgent precision, d is population density, and ud is the interaction of unemployment and population density. The shared predictions of both the security measures mechanism and the information cost mechanism are that: (1) precision and unemployment (proxying for improved security and/or low information costs) will be negatively correlated in a simple regression; and (2) the coefficient  be negative in equation (2), as high unemployment (again, as a proxy) reduces precision particularly in regions with dense populations.
Unfortunately we are unable to distinguishing between those mechanisms using the data we have in hand, and must leave that investigation to future work.
Data 12
We study the relationship between unemployment and violence at the local level in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. In all three countries countries we collected observations of these variables for the smallest geographical units for which reliable population data were available, the district (n=398) in Afghanistan, the district (n=104) in Iraq, and the province (n=76) in the Philippines.
Our key dependent variable is the intensity of insurgent activity measured as the rate of attacks per capita against government forces and their allies. We generate these measures by aggregating incident-level data and focus on the rate of incidents because tightly geo-located data on Coalition and insurgent casualties are not publicly available for Iraq or Afghanistan. To maintain comparability of our estimates across countries we use incident rates as our primary dependent variable.
12 Data provided by the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) Project. The unclassified information from the SIGACT data do not measure the consequences of attacks, so we supplement them with data from Iraq Body Count (IBC), which uses press reporting to identify incidents that kill non-combatants. The IBC data capture 13,335 incidents in which civilians were killed (that can be accurately geolocated). These incidents account for 49,391 civilian deaths. Each incident includes a reported target. We divide these killings into three categories, which will provide analytical leverage on the relationship between unemployment and violence:
1. Insurgent killings of civilians in the course of attacking Coalition or Iraqi government targets.
Coalition killings of civilians.
3. Sectarian killings, which includes all killing of civilians not falling in the other categories, capturing ethnic cleansing, reprisal killings, and the like.
Insurgent precision is measured as the proportion of SIGACT attacks in a district/quarter which do not result in IBC civilian casualty incidents, in the first category. That proportion averages 92.3%, weighted by population. 13 The information provided in the unclassified SIGACT data are limited to the fact of and type of terrorist/ insurgent attacks (including improvised explosive devices [IEDs] ) and the estimated date and location they occurred. Each incident was assigned a unique location identification number that allows it to be plotted at the village level. In the Philippine case the insurgent precision rate is 81.6%.
The lack of fine-grained data on unemployment is the limiting factor in our analysis in all three countries. In Afghanistan we use five waves of the Afghan National Quarterly Assessment Report (ANQAR) household surveys, which we have from 1997-1999, 2001 -2003, and 2006) . Table 1 provides population-weighted summary statistics for incident counts and other key variables.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.]
Several facts stand out from Table 1 . First, the insurgency in Iraq is substantially more intense than that in Afghanistan or the Philippines, when measured in incidents per thousand. The civilian casualty rate is also an order of magnitude higher in Iraq than in the Philippines. Second, provinces in the Philippines are larger than districts in Iraq, and especially larger than those in Afghanistan, so our estimates for the latter two may allow more precise matching of .incidents to unemployment and other demographic information which may predict violence. In Iraq our proxy for the proportion Sunni in a district is the vote share of political parties associated with the Sunni denomination at the governorate level, which averages 21%. In the Philippines we measure 5.4% of the population as Muslim, concentrated in the southern islands. In Afghanistan we measure the percent Pashtun (averaging 38.5%), the proportion of males in a household (which may vary because of migration, and averages 52%) and household size (which averages 9.6 persons).
Estimation
We seek to estimate the relationship between violence and unemployment in the equation (1), reproduced here with time subscripts and with a region specific fixed effect,
where v measures the incidence of violence, u is the unemployment rate, r indicates region (districts in Iraq and Afghanistan, provinces in the Philippines),  r are regionspecific fixed effects, and  t are period effects. Bearing in mind that violence is likely to reduce employment (by discouraging investment, consumption and production) we will interpret our estimate of the best linear predictor, , as an underestimate of the causal effect of unemployment on violence. Table 2 reports regression analysis for Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. The dependent variable in all specifications is the number of attacks against government forces-a category that includes both Coalition and Iraqi government forces in the Iraqi SIGACTS data. The key independent variable is the unemployment rate in that district/quarter (Iraq and Afghanistan) or province/year (Philippines). In Table 2 we report linear regressions on the number of attacks per 1,000 population.
We control for time-invariant region-specific characteristics in two ways. Our key finding is reported in Table 2 The statistical power of Table 2 lies not in the individual coefficient estimates but in the combination. Separated by time and space, the experiences of the three countries with unemployment and insurgent violence can be treated as unrelated, so the t-ratios from the three countries are independent. We can therefore test the null hypothesis that unemployment and violence are positively correlated , i.e., H 0 : > 0, using a statistic based on the sum of the t-ratios. That statistic, using the fixed effects estimates for the entire countries in the second column from the right, top three panels, yields a statistic of [ (1/ ) *( t iraq +t philippines + t afghanistan ) = (1/ ) *( -1.31 -3.10 -1.43) = ] -3.375. That statistic is asymptotically normal, (as it sums asymptotically normal t-ratios), and corresponds to a p-value of 0.037%. A two tailed test of H 0 : =0 yields a p-value of 0.074% . Either way, the null hypotheses are rejected with power two orders of magnitude beyond conventional levels. The evidence of a negative correlation of unemployment and violence is extremely strong.
An alternative approach makes the statistical power that comes from combining estimates across countries a little more intuitive. Exploiting again the independence of the t-ratios across countries, we can treat them as three independent hypothesis tests, and multiplies probabilities to form a joint test. If we start with the prior that unemployment and violence are positively correlated in all three countries, i.e., H 0 : > 0, then, based on the fixed effects estimates for the entire countries in the second column from the right, top three panels, the three joint one-tailed tests would be rejected at a significance level of (1-.1 * .01 * .1 =) 99.99%. 16 Alternatively, if the prior were that these two variables are always not correlated, i.e., H 0 : = 0, then the three joint two-tailed tests would reject the null at (1-.2 * .01 * .2 =) 99.96 % , again based on the second column from the right, top three panels. The likelihood of a statistical fluke when these results are combined across countries is miniscule.
An alternative estimation approach when using count data is to assume a functional form and estimate using maximum likelihood methods. Appendix Table S1 takes that approach, assuming a negative binomial probability distribution for the data generating process -a generalization of a Poisson process that allows for arbitrary 16 The actual product of p-values from a one-tailed test is 0.0000069 .
variance. The advantage of this approach is a gain in both precision and consistency, if the assumed functional form is correct. The disadvantages are inconsistency if the distribution is not negative binomial, and no latitude to allow for serial correlation in the error terms -running the risk of overstating precision. In practice, Table S1 reports qualitatively similar results. In the fixed effects specification, which is preferred because it allows for the greatest control over unobserved district-specific contributors to violence, the correlation of unemployment and violence is negative in all the national samples. So the basic finding is robust to specifications beyond the linear.
Recall that while the prediction of the opportunity cost model on the link between wages and the number of insurgents was unambiguously negative in the discussion above, the link to violence was muted by the possibility of uncontested spaces, allowing the possibility that increased unemployment (by reducing wages) may have no effect on correlation between insurgent strength and violence. While that can explain the lack of a positive correlation, it cannot explain the negative coefficient estimates. Some other mechanism must be in play to explain these results.
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These negative coefficients are particularly striking when we consider that they are probably biased upwards by a reverse-causal relationship in which violence increases unemployment through the damage it does to the economy. They are also large, at least in Iraq, indicating that a 10% increase in unemployment from the mean level (from 10% to 11%) is associated with 0.74 less attacks per 1000 per district-quarter for the entire country, about three times the sample mean. In Baghdad the associated decrease is over twice that large, at 1.96 less attacks. While we can't learn too much statistically from three waves of nine districts in Baghdad, it does illustrate the pattern we see throughout Iraq. [INSERT FIGURE S1 ABOUT HERE.] Figure S2 illustrates the mild negative correlation in Afghanistan, between changes in AGE incidents and changes in unemployment, conditional on covariates. A regression line reproduces the coefficient in second column of results, in the third panel of Table 2 , with slope negative 0.049. The size of the circle for each district is proportional to population. It is clear from the figure that this negative correlation is not due to a few large outliers, but that the pattern is consistent across many districts.
[
INSERT FIGURE S2 ABOUT HERE.]
These results do not imply that policies which increase employment rates cause violence, since the variation in unemployment rates that's negatively correlated with violence is not necessarily due to exogenous changes in labor demand. For instance, it may instead be due to enhanced intrusive security efforts that reduce both employment and violence. Yet this negative correlation must lead us to doubt whether job creation policies actually decrease violence. What they certainly suggest is that the relationship between employment and violence is perhaps more complex than has been commonly assumed. To probe possible explanations for this pattern we now turn to a closer examination of the Iraqi insurgency where the negative correlation between unemployment and violence is strongest.
The 'Surge' and the 'Anbar Awakening'
The first obvious concern with the results from Iraq in Table 2 is that they may be driven by factors not controlled for by region and year fixed effects. Suppose, for example, that the -surge‖ in Baghdad (which began in January 2007) reduced violence but also strangled the local economy as military units built walls around specific neighborhoods and established checkpoints through the city. We would then observe a negative correlation between unemployment and violence not because unemployment increases violence but because the surge increased the former while reducing the latter.
Alternatively, we might have spurious effects because of the politically driven reduction in violence in Sunni areas between August 2006 and December 2007, due to the ‗Anbar awakening', though it is not clear why these would be associated with increased unemployment. To explore these possibilities we re-ran the basic fixed-effect regressions for Iraq but separated the sample by period and region. Table 3 reports these results.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.]
As the Table shows, which caused both high unemployment and low violence; or (2) the major changes in patterns of violence from mid-2006 on in Baghdad. The data do not allow us to rule out a spurious effect associated with the Anbar awakening, as data from one province provide insufficient precision, yet it is unclear why that process -which reduced violence, would be associated with increased unemployment.
Replication
Are these results somehow particular to officially-collected incident data? The top panel of Table 4 replicates the results in Table 3 using the Iraq Body Count data. These are included here in an effort to expose our core results to the possibility of refutation, using a second Iraqi dataset, this one based on press reports rather than on administrative data. The Table reports The lower panel of Table 4 repeats the exercise using as an outcome measure the number of civilian casualties rather than the number of incidents involving civilian casualties. Here a positive correlation appears for Insurgent-perpetrated casualties, though only in Baghdad. This exception in Baghdad may appear to be supportive evidence for an opportunity cost theory, but it is more likely evidence of a tactical failure by insurgents. Recall that these are incidents in which insurgents targeted coalition forces but killed civilians. We know from internal insurgent documents that many groups regard collateral damage-as distinct from intentionally targeting civilians-as politically problematic (Fishman and Moghadam, 2008) . We revisit tactical failure by insurgents below.
Why a negative correlation?
The negative correlation between unemployment and violence directed at government forces is inconsistent with opportunity costs being the dominant mechanism in play. Yet what is the first order connection between labor markets and violence? The result is consistent with at least three theories, as we saw in Section 3: (1) predation -insurgent violence rises in economically advantaged periods and areas because those areas become more valuable; (2) security effects -both unemployment and insurgent violence reflect government security efforts, which simultaneously suppress both; and (3) information -counterinsurgents can operate more effectively in areas with high unemployment because the cost of information is lower.
Following the logic of Section 3, we attempt to distinguish between these possibilities using data from Iraq and the Philippines, where data on civilian casualties are available. The logic is that if high unemployment proxies for either security measures or low costs of information, low insurgent precision will be predicted by: (1) unemployment; and (b) the interaction of unemployment and population density. Predation has no prediction in this regression. In Iraq, our insurgent precision variable is calculated as the proportion of attacks on coalition forces that kill no civilians. It is the difference between SIGACT and IBC incidents directed at Coalition and Iraqi forces, divided by SIGACT incidents. In the Philippines civilian casualties are reported directly in the incident data.
Adding subscripts to the estimating equation to reflect the data in hand, we have,
where p is insurgent precision, d is population density, u is measured as before (and we've included a full set of indicators for periods). Security effect and information cost theories predict that the coefficient on unemployment, π , will be negative in a short regression (equation (1)), and that the coefficient on the interaction, , will be negative in this long regression. As before, we don't think of these estimated coefficients as causal effects, but, assuming that any reverse causality between precision and unemployment is second order, we are confident in interpreting the coefficients as tests of the theory. include population density and an interaction term in the regression, we find that insurgent precision is lower in densely populated areas during both sub-periods. 19 This makes sense, as civilians are unfortunately more likely to be affected by shrapnel, overpressure, and stray small arms fire in densely-populated areas. Third, and most importantly, once we control for this density effect we find a strong negative coefficient on the interaction term between unemployment and population density, indicating that in the dense urban districts of Iraq unemployment was associated with reduced precision in both sub-periods (columns four and six) and over the entire sample period (column two).
This last result is consistent with both the security effects and information costs explanations for the negative correlation.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.]
The results from the Philippines are quite similar. Unemployment predicts significantly less violence in the pooled regression in second sample period, 2001-3 and 2006 (column 5) . The coefficient in the first sample period is positive but not statistically significant. When the interaction of unemployment and violence is inserted the coefficient on that term is negative and highly significant in the second period (column 6), as predicted by both security effects and information cost theories. The same is true in the regression that pools both periods (column 2).
Taken as a whole these results are consistent with the conjecture that insurgents switch tactics when unemployment is high, restricting themselves to weapons that allow less precise targeting of coalition forces (e.g., sensor-activated IEDs vs. commanddetonated ones) and thus inadvertently kill civilians. What we cannot determine from these data is whether that tactical switch is due to 1) increased security pressure, such as checkpoints, barriers, and patrols -that raise unemployment by restricting the movement of goods and services; or 2) improved information flows to coalition forces about insurgent activities, as the price of leaks declines when unemployment rises. These results are neutral with respect to the predation hypothesis. Recalling a grievance-based mechanism that motivated our original discussion, it's worth noting that Table 5 provides additional evidence refuting the idea that it is a dominant force; assuming that unhappy or unemployed noncombatants are more less likely to share tips with the government, one would expect insurgent precision to be high in areas with high unemployment. The Table   shows the opposite.
Conclusion
Our findings on the relationship between unemployment and insurgency in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines call into question the opportunity cost theory that dominates thinking in policy circles. These results suggest that any opportunity cost effects-at least in these three cases-are overshadowed by other forces. Combining data from three insurgencies allows us to emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and violence.
Why is higher unemployment associated with less violence? While we cannot say for certain, a closer look at the data from Iraq and the Philippines suggests that the pattern stems from the relationship between local economic conditions and counter-insurgents' efforts to combat violence, not from the labor market for insurgents. The data are consistent with two possibilities. The first is that as local economic conditions deteriorate, the price of information falls and government forces and their allies can buy more intelligence on insurgents, undermining insurgent operations. The second is simply that the techniques used to enhance security -establishing checkpoints, building barriers and conducting raids -inhibit commerce and damage the economy. Distinguishing between those alternatives, and establishing the importance of predation, is a task for future research. Our strongest finding is that, while it may still be true that increasing unemployment causes greater political violence on the margins, that effect is swamped by other mechanisms. Greater unemployment in these three conflicts predicts less political violence, not more.
Our research presents two serious policy implications for academics, donor countries, and aid organizations. First, the negative correlation of unemployment with violence indicates that aid and development efforts that seek to enhance political stability through short-term job creation programs may well be misguided. Instead, development funds are likely to buy more ‗no-bang for the buck' when directed at small-scale projects that improve the quality of local government services, thereby inducing noncombatants to share intelligence about insurgents with their government and its allies. We find evidence for just such an effect in related research on the impact of U.S. reconstruction spending in Iraq (Berman, Felter and Shapiro, 2008) .
Second, much more basic research is required to guide development aid spent in efforts to rebuild social and political order. These programs are not methodically evaluated the way comparable domestic programs would be. This is a tragedy. Aid resources are scarce and the needs massive. A better understanding of how, when, and where aid spending helps reduce political violence will both further our understanding of insurgencies, while helping to guide practitioners in applying limited development aid in conflict and post-conflict societies.
United States Army, The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. Army Field Manual
No. 2006 ; http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf). Note: Variables on axes are residuals from a regression that includes fixed effects and regressors (-X‖): percent Pashtun, percent male, percent with no schooling, and average household size. FEs include both wave and district effects.
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Appendix Table S1 Note: All regressions include time effects. The coefficient on population is fixed to unity, in order to control for scale (using the Stata -exposure‖ option). Sample sizes vary as regions with no incidents during the entire sample period are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1, one-tailed with H 0 : > 0. Variables described in note to Table 1. 
